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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900128-CA
Priority No. 2

LORENZO H. HUBBARD,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less
than first degree felonies).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did Officer Smith have a reasonable suspicion to stop
the automobile in which Mr. Hubbard was a passenger?
2. Did the subsequent detention exceed its proper scope?
3. Were the warrantless searches valid as a result of
Mr. Hubbard's consent?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Findings of fact are reversed when they are clearly in
error, and conclusions of law are reversed when they are incorrect.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326f 327 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 108
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah 1989).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will
be relied upon, and are contained in either Appendix 1 or the body
of the brief:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Hubbard was charged with two counts of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance (R. 6-7). One of those counts
was bound over by the magistrate (T. 42).
On November 27, 1989, Mr. Hubbard filed a motion to
suppress evidence seized by the police and a supporting memorandum
of points and authorities (R. 37-44).

The hearing on this motion

was held on December 21, 1989, after which hearing the court denied
the motion to suppress (T. 1-39).

A copy of the trial court's order

denying the motion to suppress (R. 62-63) is included in Appendix 2
to this brief.
On February 2, 1990, Mr. Hubbard entered a conditional no
contest plea to one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann
§ 58-37-8 (R. 66-72).
Acting pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988), the trial court accepted the conditional plea, which was
conditioned on the appeal of the trial court's denial of
Mr. Hubbard's motion to suppress (R. 66-72; T. 40-48).

The trial

court sentenced Mr. Hubbard to a term of zero to five years in the
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Utah State Prison and stayed the sentence pending this appeal
(R. 73).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the afternoon on July 9, 1989, police officer Bruce
"B.L." Smith stopped a car because he remembered the license plate
number of the car from a previous "attempt to locate" (T. 3-5). The
term was explained as follows:
THE COURT: I have one question: What is an
attempt to locate?
THE WITNESS: If somebody breaks a window and
somebody sees a car leaving the scene, they call
in and say: Somebody just broke a window. And
the complaint taker would say: Did you see
them? Yeah, they left in a brown Subaru, south
on State from 9th South.
THE COURT: You take that as meaning it's
been associated with some possible crime and
that's why you're attempting to locate?
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
(T. 21).
The attempt to locate had been issued some seventy days
earlier, on May 1, 1989 (T. 13), and was no longer on the dispatch
computer, apparently because attempts to locate are deleted from the
computer seventy-two hours after they are entered (T. 15). The
attempt to locate specified only the make and license number of the
vehicle and that the charge involved was theft (T. 13, 22).
When Officer Smith first thought he recognized the license
plate number, the car was parked at the Rose Bar, but before Officer
Smith could find out from the papers in his binder the status of the
attempt to locate, the car left the Rose Bar (T. 4, 14).
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As Officer Smith followed the car, he called for a backup
and then made an "investigatory stop" "to determine who was in the
vehicle" (T. 4 ) . After he successfully stopped the car, Officer
Smith called dispatch to have them pull the case relating to the
attempt to locate, but dispatch had no information (T. 5). Officer
Smith explained the lack of information by noting that attempts to
locate are routinely deleted from the dispatch computer three days
after they are entered (the attempt to locate was over two months
old) (T. 15).
Officer Smith asked the driver of the car, Henry
Overstreet, for his driver's license, which he did not have, and
took Mr. Hubbard's license and the other information gathered back
to his car to run a registration and warrants check (T. 16).
Officer Smith discovered that Mr. Overstreet's license was suspended
(T. 5-6).

Officer Smith arrested Mr. Overstreet, searched him, and

charged him with possession of contraband found during the search
(T. 6). Officer Smith gave Mr. Overstreet to another officer for
transportation to the jail (T. 6-7).
Officer Smith approached Mr. Hubbard, whom Officer Smith
knew was the registered owner of the car (T. 23), who was being
held1 outside of the car, apparently near the open passenger door
(T. 17). He indicated that he did not know if Mr. Hubbard had

1

The transcript is unclear as to whether Mr. Hubbard was
being detained by actual physical contact with the police. See
T. 17 ("Q. And you were holding him outside the car or inside the
car? A. Outside the car.").
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exited the car on his own or at the request of one of the other
officers or at Officer Smith's request (T. 20). Officer Smith asked
Mr. Hubbard if he had any narcotics, stolen property or weapons in
the car or on his person. (T. 7-8). Mr. Hubbard indicated that he
had a small knife on his person and consented to be frisked (T. 9,
17) .2
Officer Smith testified that his purpose in frisking
Mr. Hubbard was not to search for weapons, because Officer Smith was
not concerned with danger from Mr. Hubbard:
At that time, as far as I was concerned,
there was no danger as to Mr. Hubbard. The
investigatory stop was to determine who was in
the vehicle at that time, so that information
could be forwarded to the detective to follow up
on his case; if the case was still open; if he
needed to show pictures, I could give them the
name of three individuals in that car.
There was no — I felt that there was no
danger for a pat down for weapons at that time.
(T. 17). Officer Smith frisked Mr. Hubbard and found the knife
(T. 9 ) .
Officer Smith noticed a wallet sitting on the passenger
seat and asked Mr. Hubbard's permission to search the car (T. 18),

2

Officer Smith's trial testimony is somewhat confusing.
He testified that he asked Mr. Hubbard if he had any "dope,
narcotics, stolen property, or weapons" in the car, and Mr. Hubbard
responded first with a sweeping hand motion (T. 7-8). Officer Smith
testified that he then asked Mr. Hubbard if that meant yes, and
Mr. Hubbard indicated "Yeah." (T. 8). Later testimony clarifies
that in using the hand motion and saying "yeah", Mr. Hubbard was not
admitting that he had contraband but was consenting to the search.
Accord R. 38 (motion to suppress) and R. 48-49 (preliminary hearing
transcript). See also T. 18 (Officer Smith testified that at the
time he began searching the wallet, he had no probable cause to
suspect that he would find contraband (T. 18).
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and Mr, Hubbard made a sweeping motion with his hand (T. 8)• When
Officer Smith asked if that meant yes, Mr. Hubbard said, "Yeah."
(T. 8-9). Officer Smith testified that he picked up a wallet from
the seat of the car (T. 9-10).
At the time that Officer Smith picked up the wallet,
Mr. Hubbard was not under arrest (T. 18). Officer Smith indicated
that he had no probable cause to believe that Mr. Hubbard was
carrying drugs, contraband or weapons, although Officer Smith was
familiar with Mr. Hubbard's criminal and drug history (T. 18-19).
When Officer Smith opened the wallet, he found an empty
plastic bag, and told Mr. Hubbard it was empty, to which, according
to the officer, Mr. Hubbard responded, "They all better be."
(T. 10). Officer Smith then found two containers containing
suspicious substances inside the wallet (T. 10).
After Officer Smith arrested Mr. Hubbard, he did a complete
inventory search of the car (T. 20) .
At the time that Officer Smith was speaking with
Mr. Hubbard about searching the vehicle, there was at least one and
perhaps three other officers standing nearby (T. 6-7, 10). No guns
were drawn (T. 11). The stop and search were made near 200 East and
3190 South and there were other cars but no pedestrians nearby
(T. 11). Officer Smith apparently knew one of the other passengers
in the car and had also had prior dealings with Mr. Hubbard and was
corrected when he addressed Mr. Hubbard by the wrong name (T. 15).

Lorenzo Hubbard testified that he was in his 1975 Buick
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Electra on July 9, when Officer Smith pulled the car over
(T. 23-24).

Officer Smith pulled the car over, asked the driver,

Mr. Overstreet, for identification and registration, and then
recognized the passenger in the back seat of the car (T. 24).
Officer Smith also recognized Mr. Hubbard and called him by the
wrong name, but Mr. Hubbard corrected him, "Bill, you know, you know
me."

Officer Smith replied, "Sonny." (T. 25). After Officer Smith

asked Mr. Overstreet for identification, he asked Mr. Hubbard for
identification, and Mr. Hubbard pulled his driver's license from his
wallet and gave the license to Officer Smith (T. 25). Officer Smith
took the license back to his car and Mr. Hubbard put his wallet on
the seat of the car (T. 25).
Five or ten minutes later, Officer Smith returned to the
car and informed Mr. Overstreet that he had a warrant for his
arrest, asked him to get out of the car and handcuffed him (T. 25).
The backup police officer took Mr. Overstreet to a police car, and
that process took five or ten minutes (T. 26).
After Mr. Overstreet was arrested, Officer Smith approached
the car and said, "If you're dirty you better have time to clean
up," and directed Mr. Hubbard to exit the car (T. 26). Mr. Hubbard
and the back seat passenger exited the car (T. 26). Officer Smith
informed Mr. Hubbard that there was a "make up" on the car for
theft, and Mr. Hubbard told the officer, "Lee and them is already in
jail." (T. 26). Officer Smith asked permission to search the two
gentlemen, received Mr. Hubbard's consent to search him, and frisked
Mr. Hubbard (T. 27). Officer Smith then asked whose wallet it was,
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and Mr. Hubbard claimed it as his (T. 27, 28).
While Officer Smith was holding the wallet, he asked
permission to search the car, and Mr. Hubbard told him to go ahead
(T. 27) . Officer Smith then searched Mr. Hubbard's wallet (T. 27).
Officer Smith neither requested nor obtained Mr. Hubbard's consent
to search the wallet (T. 27). Mr. Hubbard did not tell Officer
Smith not to search the wallet (T. 29).
When Officer Smith asked Mr. Hubbard what the first piece
of plastic was, Mr. Hubbard indicated, "I don't know, but it better
be nothing." (T. 28). Officer Smith later found the controlled
substance (T. 28). Officer Smith asked for and received consent to
search the trunk of the car, and another officer arrested
Mr. Hubbard and took him away (T. 28).
Between the time that the car was stopped and Mr. Hubbard
was handcuffed, about forty five minutes passed (T. 29).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The initial investigatory stop was not justified by a
reasonable suspicion held by Officer Smith because the attempt to
locate was over seventy days old, no longer in the dispatch
computer, based on hearsay, and vague.
Assuming arguendo that the initial stop was justified, the
subsequent detention exceeded its proper scope.

After Officer Smith

determined that Mr. Hubbard was the registered owner of the car and
did not have a warrant out on him, he had no basis to further detain
Mr. Hubbard.

Officer Smith had no probable cause to search
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Mr. Hubbard, his wallet, or his car.
Mr. Hubbard's consent to the search of his person and the
search of his car were not given voluntarily.
Even if Mr. Hubbard's consent to the search of his person
and the search of his car were given voluntarily, they were obtained
through the exploitation of the illegal detention and/or stop.
Assuming arguendo that the consent given to search
Mr. Hubbard's person and car were voluntary and sufficiently
independent from the illegal detention and/or stop, Officer Smith
exceeded the scope of the consents in searching Mr. Hubbard's wallet
and the containers therein.
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress and remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.

ARGUMENT
I.
OFFICER SMITH HAD
NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
JUSTIFY THE INITIAL STOP.
In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990), cert.
filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep 78 (Utah 1990), this Court set forth the
rudimentary principles governing traffic stops:
The protective shield of the fourth
amendment applies when an officer stops an
automobile on the highway and detains its
occupants. A police officer may constitutionally
stop a citizen on two alternative grounds.
First, the stop "could be based on specific,
articulable facts which, together with rational
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inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude [defendant] had
committed or was about to commit a crime."
Second, the police officer can "stop an
automobile for a traffic violation committed in
the officer's presence."
Id. at 883 (brackets by the Court, citations omitted).
The trial court's ruling that Officer Smith's initial stop
was justified (R. 63) was clear error.
The attempt to locate relied on by Officer Hubbard was over
seventy days old on the day of Mr. Hubbard's arrest and was based on
hearsay from an unidentified declarant (T. 13, 21). The attempt to
locate apparently had not been reactivated since it was deleted from
the dispatch computer two months before the stop (T. 15) and
specified only the make and license number of the vehicle and that
the vehicle allegedly had been involved in a theft of unspecified
property (T. 13, 22).
Officer Smith indicated that it was his own unique policy
to maintain a clipboard with old attempts to locate (T. 13).
When compared with the facts of State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d
718 (Utah 1985)(per curiam), the facts in the instant case do not
support a finding of a reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Hubbard's
car.

In Swanigan, a police officer noticed two suspects in the

vicinity of a crime on the night of the crime, and the dispatch
published an attempt to locate based on the officer's observations.
Id. at 719.

When a different officer stopped the two suspects, who

were still in the vicinity of the crime, the court found that he had
no reasonable suspicion to do so.

Id.
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In the instant case, the incident involved in the attempt
to locate was two months old (T. 13) and was not tied to a location
near Mr. Hubbard's car at the time of the stop (T. 22). While the
attempt to locate in Swanigan was issued on the basis of the
observations of an identified police officer and a specific crime,
the attempt to locate in the instant case was never tied to a
declarant or a specific crime—as Officer Smith explained to the
trial court, the attempt to locate could have been based on a
telephone call made to the police by anyone (T. 21). See State v.
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 648-651 (Utah 1989) (Terry stop based on police
broadcast is proper if officer issuing the broadcast has reasonable
suspicion to justify the stop).
The facts of this case do not demonstrate a reasonable
suspicion when compared with the facts of cases in which attempts to
locate formed the basis of a reasonable suspicion.

See State v.

Torres, 508 P.2d 534 (Utah 1973) (officer properly stopped a suspect
described in a ten-minute-old attempt to locate, involving a
fifteen-minute-old crime); and State v. Dixon, 531 P.2d 1301 (Utah
1975) (officer properly stopped a suspect fitting the description
broadcast in an attempt to locate; the crime, attempt to locate, and
arrest all occurred on the same night).

II.
THE DETENTION EXCEEDED
ITS PROPER SCOPE.
As this Court explained in State v. Robinson and Towers,
Case No. 890053-CA (Utah App. July 18, 1990), a case involving a
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traffic violation stop, even when automobile stops are valid, the
subsequent detention must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of
serious criminal activity.

Id. at 6.

See also State v. Schlosser,

774 P.2d 1132, 1135-1136 (Utah 1989) (when detention exceeds its
proper scope, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
is violated).
The trial court made no finding relating to the propriety
of the detention following the initial stop3 and clearly erred in
failing to recognize the lack of a reasonable suspicion to support
the forty-five-minute detention of Mr. Hubbard (T.29).
Assuming arguendo that the initial stop was proper, after
Officer Smith determined that there was no information available
concerning the attempt to locate (T. 15), that there were no
warrants out on Mr. Hubbard (T. 16), and that Mr. Hubbard was the
registered owner of the car (T. 23), he had no basis to further
detain Mr. Hubbard.
Officer Smith testified that when he detained and searched
Mr. Hubbard, he had no probable cause to believe that he would find
weapons, drugs, or contraband, and indicated that Mr. Hubbard was
not under arrest (T. 17-19) .
While Officer Smith articulated no basis for the detention
following the warrants check, the officers in Robinson and Towers
did.

The officers there attempted to justify the detention of

3

But see State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 and n.l
(Utah App. 1990) (explaining that thorough written findings of fact
facilitate appellate review of rulings on motions to suppress).
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Robinson and Towers on several factors—nervous behavior, evasive
conversations, lack of clothing to support the claim that the
gentlemen were on their way to a two-week trip to the Wind Rivers,
and failure of the gentlemen to produce proof that they had
permission to be driving the van, which they did not own.
at 6.

Id,

Nonetheless, this Court found the proffered bases for the

stop inadequate, "In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly
erred in its finding that the troopers had the reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity necessary to justify their continued detention
and questioning of Robinson and Towers once the warning citation was
given and the purposes for the initial stop had been accomplished.
Defendants7 detention after that point was, therefore, a violation
of their fourth amendment rights." Id. at 8.
In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the court
rejected as a basis for a post-traffic violation detention the
furtive movements of a passenger in the car and the driver's
approaching the arresting officer outside of the car with
registration and license in hand.

Id. at 1134-1136.

The officer in

Schlosser, like Officer Smith in the instant case, had "no probable
cause, and no articulable suspicion either that his safety was in
danger or that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity.

He

cited no safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he sought
only to investigate the possibility that defendants were engaged in
illegal activity."

Id. at 1137.

Just as the officer's inadequate proffer of articulable
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion justifying the detention
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failed in Robinson and Towers and Schlosser, Officer Smith's
complete lack of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion
to justify the detention of Mr. Hubbard renders it illegal under
Fourth Amendment standards.

III.
THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT THE CONSENT WAS
VOLUNTARY AND INDEPENDENT FROM
THE ILLEGAL DETENTION.
As this Court explained in State v. Robinson and Towers,
Case No. 890053-CA (Utah App. July 18f 1990),
Two factors determine whether consent to a search
is lawfully obtained following police action that
violates the fourth amendment, such as the
unlawful detention here: (1) the consent must be
voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality. Arroyo , 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
Both tests must be met in order for evidence
obtained in searches following police illegality
to be admissible. Id.
Slip opinion at 9.
Although the trial court found that Mr. Hubbard gave
voluntary consent to the search of his person, his car, and his
wallet (T. 63), the trial court did not specify the factors leading
to the conclusion that Mr. Hubbard's consent was voluntary, and made
no findings relating to the taint of the prior illegality on that
consent (the trial court did not recognize any illegality in Officer
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Smith's conduct). 4
More problematic is the trial court's apparent shifting of
the burden of proof on the issue of consent,
I can't say, Counsel, that this was coerced. I
just don't see enough evidence that this was a
coersive [sic] atmosphere in giving this
consent. It seems to me it was a voluntary
concept [sic].
(T. 37-38).
As this Court noted in Robinson and Towers,
[A] prosecutor attempting to prove voluntary
consent after illegal police action "'has a much
heavier burden to satisfy than when proving
consent to search' which does not follow police
misconduct."
Id. at 9, n. 7, quoting State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15,
quoting United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th
Cir. 1984).

A. THE CONSENT WAS NOT PROVEN VOLUNTARY.
As this Court explained in the Robinson and Towers case,
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary
or was the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied, is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. While knowledge of the right
to refuse consent is one factor to be taken
into account, the government need not

4

December
770 P.2d
issuance
June 28,

See footnote 3, supra.

The hearing on the motion to suppress occurred on
21, 1989, after this Court's opinion in State v. Arroyo,
153 (Utah App. Feb. 15, 1989) was issued and prior to the
of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in that case on
1990.
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establish such knowledge as the sine qua non
of effective consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973). In examining all the surrounding
circumstances to determine if in fact the consent
to search was coerced, a court must take into
account both the details of police conduct and
the characteristics of the accused, Arroyo, 137
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, which include "subtly
coercive police questions, as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person who consents." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
229. It is the State's burden to prove that a
consent to search was voluntary."
Slip opinion at 9.
In this case, Officer Smith stopped Mr. Hubbard's car for
no apparent reason.5

After noting his acquaintance with

Mr. Hubbard, the officer confiscated Mr. Hubbard's identification
and returned to the patrol car (T. 15, 16). Officer Smith then
searched and arrested the driver of the car, Mr. Overstreet (T. 6).
Mr. Hubbard was then asked out of his car and held there while two
or three officers looked on, and Officer Smith questioned him
concerning possession of drugs, weapons and stolen property (T. 6-8,
10, 20-26).

Officer Smith then asked Mr. Hubbard if he could frisk

him, and did so (T. 9, 18). This detention lasted some forty-five
minutes (T. 29).
The lack of drawn guns and the fact that the detention
occurred in daylight (T. 11) do not distract from the coercive

5

Officer Smith did not indicate that he told Mr. Hubbard
about the attempt to locate at all; Mr. Hubbard indicated that
Officer Smith told him about it after Mr. Overstreet was arrested
and Mr. Hubbard and the other passengers were asked out of the car
(T. 26).
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nature of the detention.

The prosecution did not demonstrate any

knowledge on the part of Mr. Hubbard that he had the right to refuse
the illegal detention and search, nor did the prosecution
demonstrate a subjective state of mind on the part of Mr. Hubbard
indicating that he felt at ease with the police.
These facts compare with those in Robinson and Towers, in
which this Court determined for the first time on appeal that the
consent given was not voluntary, stating:
Here, the defendants were first questioned
about their right to possession of the van during
the brief, initially valid traffic stop. Once
the legal basis for that stop had ended, after a
short period of detention, they were nonetheless
not free to leave. They were detained and
questioned about matters other than the traffic
violation on the side of the interstate by two
armed police officers with apparent, though
false, authority to do so, then ordered by one
trooper to remain at the van and await his
return. They complied with his commands. Next,
they were questioned about whether they were
carrying any contraband and asked to consent to a
search of the vehicle. There is no evidence that
Robinson was aware or was informed that he did
not have to accede to the trooper's request. At
that time, it was apparent that the defendants
would be kept in that custodial environment until
the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the
contents of the van, particularly the area under
the bed. In light of the troopers' questioning
and conduct, the coercive atmosphere at the time,
and the other surrounding circumstances, we
conclude that the State has not borne its burden
of proving that Robinson's consent to search the
vehicle was voluntary.
Id. at 10.
In short, in this case, as in Robinson and Towers, the
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving voluntary consent,
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and in finding inadequate evidence of coercion, the trial court
improperly shifted the burden of proof, and clearly erred.

B. THE CONSENT WAS TAINTED BY THE ILLEGAL DETENTION
AND/OR STOP.
As the court explained in State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv.
Rep. 13 (Utah 1990):
The basis for the second part of the
two-part analysis is found in the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Son v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which stated that a
trial court must determine in such a case
"'whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.,H 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). The
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been
extended to invalidate consents which, despite
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation
of a prior police illegality.
Id. at 16.
The court further explained the factors to be considered in
determining whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating
that the consent was not tainted by preceding illegalities:

whether

warnings of rights were given, the temporal proximity of the
illegality and the consent, intervening circumstances,6 and the
purpose and flagrancy of the illegality.

6

Id. at 18 n. 4.

For examples of intervening circumstances, see e.g.
Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (the
defendant was allowed to consult with his companion in his car);
Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (the defendant
was admonished that his consent was not mandated).
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The prosecution presented no evidence that Mr. Hubbard was
informed of his right to refuse consent to the search of his wallet,
his car, or his person.
The illegalities during the forty-five-minute detention and
the consent were temporally proximate.

Officer Smith's conduct

moved from one illegality (improper stop (T. 4)) to the next
(detention of Mr. Hubbard after warrants check indicated no reason
to hold Mr. Hubbard (T. 16)), to the next (asking him out of his car
(T. 20, 26)), to the next (asking him about possessing drugs, guns,
stolen property (T. 7-8)), to the next (searching his person without
any reasonable suspicion or probable cause (T.17)), to seeing the
wallet (T. 17-18), to obtaining permission to search the car, and
then searching the wallet (T. 18).
The prosecution presented no evidence of any intervening
circumstances, see n. 6, supra, between the illegalities and the
consent.
The prosecution presented no evidence of any purpose
whatsoever for Officer Smith's misconduct.

Mr. Hubbard was not

under arrest until after Officer Smith searched his wallet (T. 18).
Officer Smith perceived no threat of weapons or danger from
Mr. Hubbard (T. 17). Officer Smith had no probable cause to believe
that he would find any weapons, drugs or other contraband (T. 18).
Whether Officer Smith's purpose was to randomly fish for evidence of
crime, to satisfy his curiosity, to exercise his police power, or to
harass the occupants of Mr. Hubbard's car, his purpose was
flagrantly improper.
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In short, the State failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating that Mr. Hubbard's consent was not tainted by Officer
Smith's illegal conduct.

See State v. Arroyo. 137 Utah Adv. Rep.

13, 15-17 and n. 4 (Utah 1990) (giving additional examples of and
authority for this mode of analysis).

IV.
OFFICER SMITH EXCEEDED
THE SCOPE OF CONSENT.
Assuming arguendo that Mr. Hubbard's consent was voluntary
and not the result of Officer Smith's illegal conduct, a further
issue remains:
that consent?

Did Officer Smith's searches exceed the scope of
As this Court explained in State v. Marshall. 791

P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990), cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah
1990),
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent
itself
Any police activity that transcends
the actual scope of the consent given encroaches
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."
United States v. Gav. 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th
Cir., 1985); See e.g. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d
193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of consent exceeded
when police asked to "look around" the house,
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms,
drawers, boxes and closed containers).
Id. at 888.
The trial court made no finding resolving the dispute
between Officer Smith's testimony that the wallet was in the car
when he asked permission to search the car and Mr. Hubbard's
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testimony that the wallet was in Officer Smith's hand when he asked
permission to search the car.

See footnote 3, supra.

If that

finding were that the wallet was in Officer Smith's hand at the time
he asked permission to search the car, it would seem clear that
Officer Smith exceeded the scope of the consent to search the car
when he searched the wallet.

Marshall at 888.

Assuming arguendo that Officer Smith was accurate in his
indication that the wallet was in the car when he obtained
permission to search the car, the search was nonetheless invalid.
Officer Smith's requesting permission to search the car was
deceptive, vitiating any consent given.

Before asking permission to

search the car, Officer Smith saw the wallet (T. 18) and asked
Mr. Hubbard whose it was (T. 27, 28). If Officer Smith wanted to
search the wallet, he should have asked permission to do so, rather
than requesting permission to search the car.

Compare State v.

Lorenzo, 743 S.W.2d 529, 531-532 (Mo. App. 1987) (when officer
gained permission to look inside van, permission did not extend to
permit search of van and contents; "Consent to search cannot be
considered freely and intelligently given when a police officer
misleads the person from whom consent is sought as to his
intentions.").

See also State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah

App. 1990) (citing People v. Thiret. 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984),
and summarizing it, "scope of consent exceeded when police asked to
'look around' the house, then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms,
drawers, boxes and closed containers.").
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CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the trial court's order denying
the motion to suppress the evidence seized in violation of
Mr. Hubbard's right against unreasonable search and seizure and
remand this case for a new trial excluding the illegally seized
evidence.
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APPENDIX 1

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING SUPPRESSION
OF EVIDENCE
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR89-1185

v.
LORENZO HUBBARD,

Honorable Frank G. Noel
Defendant

On December 21, 1989, the above entitled matter came on
for hearing in response to the defendant's motion to suppress.

The

defense submitted a memorandum of points and authorities, testimony
was heard from the arresting officer, B.L. Smith, and from the
defendant.

Argument was then heard from counsel for the State and

counsel for the defendant.

Having considered all of the above, the

Court then found there was consent to search the car, the person of
the defendant
voluntarily

and the defendant's wallet; that

given;

Ceil**--

that

the

investigatory

stop

the consent was
was

justified.

/-&sr-?"d
COGG:

ORDER DENYING SUPPRESSION
OF EVIDENCE
Case No. CR89-1185
Page 2

Therefore the Court declines to suppress any and all evidence that
the State proposes to use for trial, and most particularly the
controlled substance found
una in
in the
tne defendant's
aerenaant's wallet.
wallet.
SIGNED this

(D

day of

"v\x*v

. l<OjQ

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEI^
^
Judge, Third District Court
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1

IT TOOK PLACE AT 2 O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON.

2

CARS PASSING, THERE WERE PROBABLY PEOPLE IN THE HOUSES, OUT

3

ON THE STREET.

4

ATMOSPHERE THE COURTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WHEN THEY TALK

5

ABOUT VOLUNTARINESS.

6

THERE WAS NOT A MOB OF POLICE OFFICERS; POSSIBLY TWO OR

7

THREE.

8

NOTHING HERE THAT OFFICIATES THE VOLUNTARY CONCEPT.

9

THERE WERE

THIS IS HARDLY THE KIND OF COERSIVE

THERE WAS NO THREATENING ATMOSPHERE,

NONE OF THEM HAD THEIR GUNS DRAWN.

THERE WAS

MR. LOYD'S ARGUMENT IS THAT THE ATTEMPT TO

10

LOCATE WAS OUTDATED.

11

NOT CANCELLED, SO IT WAS STILL IN THAT SENSE —

12

STILL ACTIVE AND CERTAINLY GAVE HIM PROBABLE CAUSE AND

13

INDEED AN OBLIGATION TO STOP THAT VEHICLE AND INVESTIGATE

14

THE STATUS OF THAT.

15

BUT THE OFFICER HAS TESTIFIED IT WAS

THE COURT:

IT WAS

ALL RIGHT, THE COURT IS GOING TO

16

WORK BACKWARDS.

17

FINDS THERE WAS A CONSENT TO SEARCH THE AUTOMOBILE AND

18

PERSON.

19

WOULD EXTEND, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, TO THE

20

WALLET THAT WAS TAKEN FROM THE PERSON, OR THE DEFENDANT,

21

AND PLACED IN THE CAR.

22

CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS CONSENT.

23

THAT THIS WAS COERCED.

24

THAT THIS WAS A COERSIVE ATMOSPHERE IN GIVING THIS CONSENT.

25

I THINK THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION AND SO

THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THAT INVITATION

SO I THINK THAT UNDER THESE
I CAN'T SAY, COUNSEL,

I JUST DON'T SEE ENOUGH EVIDENCE

IT SEEMS TO ME IT WAS A VOLUNTARY CONCEPT.
CREED H. BARKER, CSR

THE QUESTION I
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1

SUPPOSE IS WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS AN ILLEGAL STOP IN THE

2

FIRST PLACE.

3

THIS ATTEMPT TO LOCATE MAY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT

4

OLD.

I CAN'T SAY IT WAS OUT DATED.

I CAN'T SAY THAT WHAT

5

AN OFFICER MAY HAVE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO STOP, AT LEAST

6

UNDER THE POLICIES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

7

HE'S NOT BOUND BY THOSE. AND THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY

8

THOSE.

9

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SO WHAT I BELIEVE THIS BOILS

OF COURSE

BUT IT WOULD SEEM TO ME HE WAS ENTITLED TO STOP IT

10

DOWN TO IS THE COURT IS GOING TO DENY THE MOTION TO

11

SUPPRESS.

12

WOULD YOU PREPARE THE ORDER, MISS BYRNE?

13

MR. BYRNE:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

14

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

15

MR. LOYD: WOULD THIS BE THE APPROPRIATE TIME

16

TO SET A COURT DATE, TRIAL DATE?

17

THE COURT:

CERTAINLY.

YOU DON'T HAVE A TRIAL

18

DATE YET IN THIS CASE?

19

THE CLERK:

JANUARY 22ND.

20

MR. BYRNE:

YOUR HONOR, I DON'T HAVE MY

21

CALENDAR WITH ME.

22

OF JANUARY.

23

IF THE COURT WILL GIVE ME LEAVE TO COME BACK IF I HAVE A

24

PROBLEM

25

I KNOW THAT I'M VERY BUSY AT THE START

AS FAR AS YOU KNOW, JANUARY 22ND IS ALL RIGHT.

—
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT, ARE YOU GOING TO YOUR

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

